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Introduction 
‘It affected him as the sequel of something of which he had lost the beginning’ -- Henry James, 
‘The Beast in the Jungle’
Henry James’s much discussed tale ‘The Beast in the Jungle’ relates the story of John Marcher’s 
life-long wait for an experience that he believes is uniquely destined for him. His friend, May Bartram, 
describes it as a sense of impending catastrophe, a sense of ‘being kept for something rare and strange, 
possibly prodigious and terrible, that was sooner or later to happen’ (James, p. 744). The two friends 
spend their whole lives in anticipation of this enormous event, imagining the possible shapes this 
‘ignominy’ or ‘monstrosity’ might take, which Marcher names his Beast in the Jungle. It is only at the 
end of the tale, following May’s untimely death, that Marcher finally realizes the truth of his life: by 
waiting for the catastrophe, he has all along been living the catastrophe itself, namely, the catastrophe 
of being the man to whom nothing will ever happen. 
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Such a sudden shift in perspective -- the realization that one ‘is’ precisely what one is waiting 
for (or waiting to become) -- recalls what Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit calls the ‘cunning of 
reason.’ In the guise of something to be awaited, the event is already occurring unseen and unremarked 
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by conscious reason. Believing that the ‘Beast’ will spring upon him from the outside, Marcher is 
unable to perceive that it has already sprung, and is eviscerating his life from within. James’s historical 
insight is thus fully modern: insofar as we imagine we stand somehow outside the grander forces that 
are shaping the world, we are blind to precisely how far we are implicated in them or, to put it in more 
conventional Kantian terms, our perceptual apparatus determines what we are able to ‘see.’ If James’s 
insight speaks particularly eloquently to us today, it is because we find ourselves in multiple different 
ways attending our own ‘Beast in the Jungle,’ whether in the form of a global version of the 
catastrophic conflagration currently engulfing the Middle East, in the cataclysmic environmental 
destruction and mass starvation predicted as a consequence of human-induced climate change, or in the 
shape of the new devastating illnesses that are being spawned by industrialized farming practices, 
pollution, technological ‘advances’ such as cloning, and so on. As these examples from our 
contemporary catastrophic horizon cannot help but bring home to us, although one customarily thinks 
of catastrophe as something massive that strikes us from the outside in typically spectacular, 
unpredictable ‘natural’ events, today we are increasingly being forced to face up to the extent to which 
we (both individually and collectively) bear a certain responsibility for them -- particularly to the extent 
that we, like Marcher, position ourselves subjectively as passively ‘awaiting’ them. 
In the aggressively resurgent theoteleological routines that are upon us now, such waiting has 
always had its place as the middle of the story whose end is in its beginning: eschatology locates its 
subjects in the meantime of the penultimate and transmutes impending catastrophe into the rapture of 
revelation that always already legitimizes the mean as a means to itself. The catastrophe is already 
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there, we are only waiting for it to occur. Which is to say that occurrence itself, a rupture in the real, is 
no longer material and therefore need not even take place. Such is the logic of catastrophism, the fully-
fledged ideological levelling of the contradictions of the catastrophic in which rapture replaces 
responsibility to, and for, rupture. Catastrophism is the denial of catastrophe as the original downturn to 
death effected by the trace instituting the time of performative response. It inverts the downturn to an 
upbeat banging away till constative Kingdom come. All will be revealed. All writing erased. 
It is thus all the more urgent to state today that the routines of theory require resistance to 
theodicy. Suspending theoteleology, theory demands the assumption of at least a heightened sensitivity 
to one’s responsibility, or ‘subjective implication’ as we propose to call it, in immense or catastrophic 
events. The recent focus on trauma is perhaps the most visible performance of such sensitivity in 
contemporary theory. As is well known, trauma studies are concerned with the way certain 
inassimilable events nevertheless manage to enter and inscribe themselves on an individual’s 
consciousness. To account for this process, trauma theory elaborates a counter-logical or at least a-
chronological temporality that recalls that of James’s tale. In a move that parallels the belatedness of 
Marcher’s realization, theorists of trauma explain that it is only once the event has been inserted into a 
meaningful context or ‘Symbolic’ system that it takes on its proper resonance as ‘traumatic.’ As an 
‘unclaimed experience,’ Cathy Caruth reminds us, the traumatic event can never be experienced as 
such, but must always be re-constructed after the fact.2 To qualify as a trauma, the event must be 
subjectivized: retroactively inserted into a narrative and imbued with a specific representational and 
affective character. All traumatic events are thus literally ‘post-traumatic.’ In this aspect, they recall the 
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backward-facing orientation of Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History: traumatic events are only ever 
lived in the mode of ‘after.’ Yet as the contributors to this volume indicate, the imperative to think 
subjectivity, memory and time as interrelated/as tied together in a Borromean way will require the 
resources not just of Benjamin but also Heidegger, at least the Heidegger of ‘Hölderlin’s Hymn’ for 
whom ‘The most violent “catastrophes” in nature and in the cosmos are nothing in the order of 
Unheimlichkeit in comparison with that Unheimlichkeit which man is in himself.’3 
The Catastrophic Imperative  attempts to think this other, ‘subjective’ causality of the 
catastrophe from a non-belated temporal horizon. From this perspective, contemporary ethical and 
political imperatives are enacted not through the preventative self-denials urged by an increasingly 
despairing left, but as a certain inevitability, as irreducible as it is still unmapped. Evoked by the essays 
collected here, catastrophe holds us accountable through a ‘memory’ of the future, that is, through the 
imperceptible, always contingent ways we as individual and social subjects have already, unconsciously 
decided it. Far from eliciting strategies for ‘changing’ the trajectory of this pre-written future, the task 
for thinking a post-global politics therefore lies, in Jean Dupuy’s immortal words, in inscribing the 
catastrophe ‘in a much more radical way.’
Marcher’s -- and by 
implication our own -- catastrophic realization will transpire not out of any incapacity to act ‘in time’ to 
avoid the cataclysmic future. Indeed, if the ignominious event is inevitable, this will not be because of 
any ‘failure of political will,’ as our pundits have already in advance decided, but because we are 
failing, collectively, to think ourselves as James’s Marcher, subjectively the very catastrophe we are 
awaiting and therefore denying.  
4 The essays collected here suggest what catastrophe might 
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look like once it has been shorn of its eschatological foundation. Removed from the necessity of 
delivering anthropological meaning -- of what, in a collective version of Marcher’s hubristic delusion, 
it might mean ‘for us’ -- catastrophe starts to become accessible as a critical concept for tracking non-
linear networks of memory regimes and their orders of reference as they are and have always been lived 
co-incident with eschatology in ‘the mean time.’ 
 J. Hillis Miller’s essay, ‘Who or What Decides: For Derrida: A Catastrophic Theory of Decision’ 
opens up the terms of the discussion by asking whether decision itself is or can be catastrophic. The 
critical term derives from Kierkegaard’s famous claim in Fear and Trembling that the moment of 
decision is madness.5
 The closing sentence of Erik Vogt’s essay reiterates Slavoj Žižek’s germane question, 
‘Are we still able to commit the act proper? Which social agent is, on account of its radical dislocation, 
today able to accomplish it?’ The author’s query emerges from his careful prior exposition of the 
apparent total capture of the social that Adorno, Heidegger and Agamben detect in catastrophic thought, 
troped as instrumental reason, Gestell, and sovereign biopolitics, respectively. With Žižek, and 
 All decisions rely on a previously given knowledge, but Miller explores the ways 
decision itself is made in a moment of madness -- at a point where theoretical and historical knowledge 
inevitably fail. Whether madness or foolishness -- that is to say, immaterial of whether it lacks 
knowledge, or is supported by existing laws -- decision precludes the supposition of an autonomous or 
self-conscious ego. Instead, as Miller argues through his explorations of the above mentioned Henry 
James and Anthony Trollope, decision overcomes us, like a catastrophe, seemingly forcing itself on us 
from the outside.  
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implicitly Lacan, Vogt ventures the thought of the exception not as something external and constitutive 
of a totality but as something inherent to that totality. Totality, he suggests, is not determined by an 
exception but rests on an antagonism that is both internal and foundational. 
Sjoerd van Tuinen’s essay, ‘Breath of Relief: Sloterdijk and the Politics of the Intimate,’ begins 
with a catastrophic quotation (in the other, Shakespearean sense suggested by Falstaff,in Henry IV,  
meaning ‘behind’)6 where Peter Sloterdijk flatly states that culture must be thought from its rupture 
with nomadism, from the moment we become saddled with our own shit (and its smell). This recalls 
Lacan’s famous ‘la culture, c’est l’égout.’ What should be expelled lies not outside us but is located in 
‘sphere’ in which we live. Both Žižek and Baudrillard have reflected in their own ways on the obscene, 
particularly in the context of contemporary politics. For these, the obscene is defined by what remains 
off-stage, the ob-scene, that has no say in (democratic) representation. Analyzing these thinkers’ 
different approaches to the obscene, van Tuinen foregrounds Sloterdijk’s call for some fresh air in the 
form of new psycho-political scenes of communication not exclusively determined by obscene 
terrorism or a psychoanalytically-inspired passion for the real. Can such a new psycho-political scene 
be represented? This is the question Justin Clemens poses in his essay. To the different ways ‘man’ has 
historically been described, Clemens adds his own Lacanian-inspired definition: ‘Man is a swarm 
animal.’ For Clemens, the contemporary social can no longer be conceived as bound by a unifying, 
representational signifier (traditionally: nation, race, identity, etc.) but as a post-symbolic ‘swarm.’ 
Clemens pursues this swarm through an in-depth reading of the Lacanian notion of S1. The homonyms 
essun (S1) and essaim (swarm) comprise what Clemens calls a ‘puncept.’ In its various permutations as 
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swarm and Schwärmerei, this revised S1 hints at the possibility of thinking a non-representational 
multiplicity whose autotaxic political ramifications remain unpredictable. 
Tom Cohen takes these ramifications to their outermost reaches in his close reading of 
Hitchcock’s ‘The Birds.’ For Cohen, the ‘cinematic’ marks itself as an historial event that threatens to 
destroy the ocularcentric program of the human as a construct. Cohen detects in Hitchcock’s birds a 
non-referential force, a nanoswarm he terms a ‘bird war,’ that brings the twin poles of the program of 
the visible into violent collision. Cohen’s predictions of coming wars of reinscription confront us with 
the necessity for thinking memory post-globally, that is, as capable of attending to other, non-
anthropomorphic temporalities invoked by inscription. Patience Moll’s rhetorical reading of the section 
on physiognomy and craniology from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit suggests one way of seizing 
upon Cohen’s challenge. Moll finds in the transformation of consciousness into spirit the traces of a 
redoubled katastrephein. In this catastrophic downturn, consciousness is confronted with its own 
materiality in the form of the post-Enlightenment ‘pseudosciences’ of physiognomy and craniology. 
Tracing the move from the former to the latter, Moll identifies a shift from the materiality of meaning 
(the facial expression of a thought) to facing materiality as such -- the skull, or pure ‘thing.’ Pursuing 
the catastrophic rhetoric of this turn, Moll argues that the concept of ‘action’ it produces must be 
understood in terms of survival; action’s imperative is neither moral nor idealistic, but both temporal 
and material. 
In ‘Catastrophe, Citationality and the Limits of Responsibility in Disgrace,’ Gert Buelens 
argues that J. M. Coetzee’s disturbing post-Apartheid novel is structured around catastrophic events 
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that produce ‘subjects’ through acts of citation and allow injury to set borders to identity. Concentrating 
on Lucy Lurie’s remarkable response to being raped by a gang of black men (she refuses to prosecute 
them and decides to become the common-law wife of a member of their extended family), the essay 
shows how this response must be understood as an act of political performativity that relies on 
citationality so as to turn the aggressor’s force in a different direction from the intended one. That Lucy 
makes this choice is linked to her acceptance of her own responsibility for her place in history. Rather 
than living as a white owner on what contemporary history morally regards as black turf, while citing 
all the time the behavioural norms of her group in a manner of which she is largely unaware but that is 
brought home to her in the detail of how the rape takes place, she will henceforth live as a tenant-
farmer on land she no longer owns, and will be fully dependent on the protection offered by her black 
landlord—her new common-law husband. Her responsibility will thus be limited by a wholly new set of 
norms that she will have to learn to cite correctly. Lucy accepts that she has been part of the problem, 
and that the only solution for a future South Africa lies in white people’s recognition of the extent to 
which their identity too must be marked by the cut of history. 
Dany Nobus’ essay reaches right into the heart of the volume’s exploration of the intricacies of 
catatrophic causation. A report by one of the victims of the London bombings of 7 July, 2005 serves as 
Nobus’ point of departure for a meditation on the status of the victim from the perspective of 
psychoanalysis. Nobus shows how psychoanalysis opts for the difficult position of neither denying 
victimhood nor refusing to acknowledge the ways such a position can have a number of uncomfortable 
-- and discomforting -- results. For Nobus, the skandalon of psychoanalysis -- that man is an animal 
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marked by a perverse and distorted relation to sexuality -- reminds us of another scandal propounded by 
psychoanalysis: every trauma conceals an unconscious choice that is as unimaginable as it is 
unavoidable. In a period when ethics is being reduced to victims’ rights, Nobus’s is a far from obvious 
and difficult claim. 
In his meditation on Nietzsche Alain Badiou asks: ‘Who is Nietzsche?’ This is not a biographical 
question but one which enquires into the relation between philosophy as crime and as proper name. For 
Badiou, Nietzsche’s gesture is both anti-philosophical and arche-political, meaning that Nietzsche 
offers neither a theory, nor an analysis nor an interpretation of the world but, on the contrary, he 
changes the world. To claim that one’s thought ‘breaks the world in two’ is not philosophy but 
antiphilosophy. It is only later that a philosophy capable of thinking Nietzsche’s truth comes into play, 
enabling us to leave Nietzsche behind. In ‘Is Pleasure a Rotten Idea?’ Aaron Schuster returns to the all-
too-hastily answered question of whether it is now time to dispense with the psychoanalytic model in 
favour of a Deleuzian paradigm that is not obsessed with lack. Classically, pleasure has been conceived 
as the (fulfillment of a) lack but desire -- Deleuze’s preferred alternative -- is witness to an excess. This 
choice stems from a discussion with Lacan for whom desire also holds a central place, albeit as ‘lack.’ 
The author notes that Deleuze’s alternative conception of desire posits no mediating Other. Insofar as 
this is possible within Deleuze’s Spinozan system, however, it becomes difficult to conceive of 
accidents or catastrophes. The philosophy of plenitude and non-limitation is found to have its own 
problems in conceiving ways of demarcating the excesses of desire. 
Regarding the question of where catastrophe occurs, Gil Chaitin claims that, neither rational nor 
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irrational, Barrès’s proto-fascism can be best understood in light of Lacan’s notion of ‘extimacy.’ 
Barrès’s Novels of National Energy exemplify his neologistic mode of escaping from the polar 
opposition of the interior and the exterior that so often haunts the discourse of identity at the heart of 
republican, nationalist and fascist ideology. The text juxtaposes the ethic of acceptance and that of 
energetic action in the person of the two main protagonists, Roemerspacher and Sturel, a conflict that 
raged in Barrès’s heart as he struggled to come to terms with the event that precipitated his plunge into 
right-wing nationalism and the forefront of the anti-Dreyfus movement, the death of his father. A denial 
of death and the consequent nothingness of the self, his nationalist ideology asserts that the core of our 
inner being is nothing but the sum of our ancestors. As Sturel eventually discovers, we can reconcile 
determinism and autonomy only by bowing to the internal compulsion of our ancestral identity. On one 
level, this entails xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Yet the description of the foreign Astiné and the plot 
of the novel reveal another, ‘extimate’ appeal to the movement, a covert enjoyment of the sadistic 
incorporation of the Other within the self. Closing out the volume, in her essay, ‘Topography of the 
Border: Derrida Rewriting Transcendental Aesthetics,’ Joanna Hodge presents an incisive analysis of 
the problems connected with Kant’s forms of pure intuition, that is, space and time. Making use of 
Derrida’s analyses in ‘Truth and Painting’ (1978) and other texts, she amends Kant’s transcendental 
aesthetic with a ‘topography of the border.’ 
We are grateful to the contributors to this volume. We would also like to thank the Flanders 
Research Foundation (FWO-Vlaanderen) for its generous support of the research project on Rhetoric 
and Literary Ethics out of which this volume emerged. Thanks, as well, to Universiteit Gent, KU 
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Leuven and the Jan van Eyck Academy, Maastricht for their institutional support, and to Palgrave 
Macmillan for their support of the project. Permission to reprint Alberto Toscano’s translation of Alain 
Badiou’s ‘Who is Nietzsche?’ which originally appeared in Pli: the Warwick Journal of Philosophy is 
gratefully acknowledged. Versions of the chapters by Gil Chaitin and J. Hillis Miller are due to appear 
with Ohio State UP and Fordham UP respectively; we are grateful to those presses for granting the 
authors permission to publish their work in our collection. 
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